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Abstract 
Despite increasing interest in IT outsourcing (ITO) and the various benefits it promises, 
Cloud Computing (CC) as the currently most prevalent ITO paradigm still entails 
serious IT security risks. Little attention has been paid so far to fully and 
unambiguously capture the complex nature of IT security risks and how to measure it. 
Against this backdrop, we first propose a comprehensive conceptualization of Perceived 
IT Security Risks (PITSR) in the CC context that is based on six distinct risk dimensions 
grounded on an extensive literature review, Q-sorting, and expert interviews. Second, a 
multiple-indicators and multiple-causes analysis of data collected from 356 
organizations is found to support the proposed conceptualization as a second-order 
aggregate construct. The results of our study contribute to IT security and ITO research, 
help (potential) adopters to assess risks, and enable CC providers to develop targeted 
strategies to mitigate risks perceived as crucial.  
Keywords:  Perceived IT Security Risks, Cloud Computing, IT Outsourcing, IS Security, 
Multi-Dimensional Scale Development 
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Introduction 
In the last decades, a majority of companies outsourced at least parts of their information systems to 
external suppliers and a broad stream of research has been dedicated to the phenomenon of IT 
outsourcing (ITO). This development is currently even reinforced by the much-discussed approach of 
“Cloud Computing” (CC) (Mell 2011). CC, a technological advancement of Application Service Provision 
(ASP) and other traditional forms of ITO, such as direct one-to-one client-provider relationships, offers 
various technical and economic advantages (Marston et al. 2011). However, because of its new service 
provision characteristics – such as a shared environment due to multi-tenancy, limited customization, 
and more standardized interfaces (Benlian et al. 2011, p. 94f) – CC induces various new crucial IT security 
risks. Although huge efforts have been made to mitigate these risks in the past (Pring 2010), various 
security incidents still recently happened in the Cloud: The Amazon EC2 cloud services crashed in April 
2011 and caused painful data losses for hundreds of clients 1; in August 2011, ironically a lightning strike 
was the reason for the downtime of Microsoft’s CC service “Business Productivity Online Suite” and 
caused that the affected client companies were unable to access e-mails, calendars, contacts, and the 
document management system for about 48 hours 2. Besides directly affected clients, the broad coverage 
in mainstream-media also reached a large number of current and potential customers and had 
devastating effects on the reputation of the respective providers – causing an undefined amount of lost 
sales. This media coverage is especially relevant in the view of the fact that in many cases it is not the 
actual IT security risk that might be crucial for the outsourcing decision, but the IT security risk perceived 
by the CIO/CEO that triggers decisions. This fact has already been recognized in other disciplines – for 
example, Gigerenzer (2004) showed that after September 11, a great deal of travelers avoided voyages by 
plane (which are typically low-risk) and consequently traveled by car or bus, which resulted in 
approximately 350 additional lost lives due to fatal accidents. This misjudgment of so called “dread risks” 
(i.e., high-impact and low-probability incidents like terrorist attacks or a lightning strike in a datacenter) 
is a phenomenon that has already been acknowledged in the broader risk literature (e.g., Slovic 1987). 
Better understanding the perceived risk and knowledge of such “risk controversies” in the outsourcing, 
and more specifically, in the CC context would allow current and potential users to better assess risks and 
providers of such solutions to better address these (sometimes unjustified) fears. 
Accordingly, researchers in our discipline have shown increased interest in incorporating IT security risks 
in outsourcing considerations (e.g., Hahn et al. 2009; Swartz 2004). However, although previous research 
studies repeatedly found that especially risks related to IT security are one of, if not the major risk factor 
affecting important outsourcing and adoption decisions (e.g., Benlian and Hess 2011), there has been little 
discussion about the complex nature of (perceived) IT security risks and how different and distinct 
dimensions constitute this concept. Since previous IT security risk studies relied on simple, uni-
dimensional and/or inconsistent conceptualizations (e.g., Chellappa and Pavlou 2002; Flavian and 
Guinaliu 2006; Casalo et al. 2007; Kim et al. 2008; Pavlou et al. 2007), the main objective of this article is 
to systematically develop a comprehensive and unambiguous meaning (i.e., conceptualization) and 
measurement (i.e., operationalization) of Perceived IT Security Risk (PITSR) in the CC context.  
By addressing this question, our study makes several contributions: First, we propose a conceptual 
framework for perceived IT security risks and provide an in-depth conceptualization for CC grounded on 
an extensive literature review and expert interviews. This enhanced framework and conceptualization of 
perceived IT security risk can be used to enhance various existing theories, e.g., through incorporation of 
perceived IT security risks in theories that explain outsourcing and adoption decisions such as the 
Technology Acceptance Model (Davis 1989), the Theory of Reasoned Action (Ajzen 1985), or the Unified 
Theory of Acceptance and Use of Technology (Venkatesh et al. 2003). Second, we develop and validate a 
measurement scale, which provides a comprehensive operationalization of IT security risks in the context 
of CC that captures its complex, multi-dimensional nature and therefore establishes a basis for further 
empirical research on the effects of perceived IT security risks on outsourcing decisions. Third, such a 
conceptualization and operationalization may help (potential) users to assess CC related risks, and enable 
providers to develop strategies to better manage and mitigate those risks. 
                                                             
1 Compare http://aws.amazon.com/message/65648/ 
2 Compare http://www.pcpro.co.uk/news/cloud/369157/L 
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The remainder of our article is structured as follows. The next section introduces the theoretical 
background of perceived IT security risks in the context of ITO and CC. Then, we present a rigorous scale 
development approach by which we develop, refine and evaluate a multi-dimensional conceptualization of 
perceived IT security risks and a corresponding measurement instrument. Finally, we discuss the 
theoretical, methodological and practical implications of our study’s results. 
Theoretical Background and Related Literature 
Based on Cunningham (1967), perceived risk is commonly thought of as the felt uncertainty regarding the 
possible negative consequences of adopting a product or service and has formally been defined as 
expectation of losses associated with a purchase. Perceived risk has been identified as an important 
inhibitor to purchase behavior (e.g., Peter and Ryan 1976) and is especially relevant in decision-making 
when the circumstances of the decision create uncertainty, discomfort and/or anxiety, and conflict in the 
decision maker (Bettman 1973). In various contexts, such as “acceptance of banking services” (Luo et al. 
2010) or “intention to outsource business processes” (Gewald and Dibbern 2009), it has been shown that 
the perceived risk has strong influence on the forming of attitudes and decision intentions (Ajzen 1985; 
Smith 1992). A rich stream of literature showed that the assessment of risk is subject to various 
constraints related to the decision maker, leading to overestimation (e.g., Gigerenzer 2004; Gregory et al. 
1993; Slovic 1987) or underestimation of risks, i.e., “unrealistic optimism” (e.g., Rhee et al. 2011). In line 
with Featherman et al. (2003) and Gewald et al. (2006), we define perceived risk as “the potential for loss 
in the pursuit of a desired outcome.” Perception of risk rises with increasingly negative consequences or 
with decreasing control over the consequences (Koller 1988). This is also consistent with the 
mathematical definition of risk by Boehm (1991), who defines risk exposure as the product of probability 
of an unsatisfactory / undesirably outcome and the loss to the parties affected if the outcome is 
unsatisfactory / undesirably. 
The analysis of risks related to different forms of outsourcing has a long history in IS research and the 
focus on specific risk dimensions changed with the specific ITO context over time. Earlier research on ITO 
risks has tended to focus on strategic and financial risks rather than IT security in detail. With the rise of 
ASP and CC, the focus of studies increasingly shifted towards increasingly arising technical risks with IT 
security risks being one of the most crucial risk factors.  
Oftentimes, studies contrasted these risks with the opportunities in order to explain outsourcing 
decisions. Early studies on ITO, such as, e.g., Quinn and Hilmer (1994), focus on the major strategic costs 
and risks of ITO. In 1996, Earl identified 11 risks associated with outsourcing IS services and distinguishes 
organizational, technical and operational, economic, and strategic risks (Earl 1996). Bahli and Rivard 
(2003) propose a scenario-based conceptualization of ITO risks and in a follow-up study; they suggest 
that client, supplier, and transaction are the three major sources of risk factors for ITO based on 
transaction costs theory (Bahli and Rivard 2005). Gewald and Dibbern (2009) analyze the factors that 
form an organization’s attitude towards external procurement as well as its intention to adopt 
outsourcing. In an extensive literature review on ITO, Lacity et al. (2009) identify 28 different risks 
related to ITO and discuss practical implications of those risks. 
In the context of Application Service Providing (ASP), as first Internet-based form of ITO and predecessor 
of Cloud Computing, Jayatilaka et al. (2002) list 15 factors that explain the ASP choice – various of these 
factors can be considered as potential risks (or potential undesired outcomes), such as, e.g., “knowledge 
risk”, “(insufficient) security of ASP”, “(insufficient) ease of modification of the application”, i.e., a high 
level of standardization due to the multi-tenancy nature where infrastructure and software are shared 
across customers, and “(insufficient) compatibility with existing infrastructure”. Currie et al. (2004) 
propose 28 Key Performance Indicators (KPIs) for potential ASP customers – the underperformance 
regarding those KPIs can be interpreted as “undesired outcome” – and reports that the top KPIs are “Data 
security and integrity”, “Disaster recovery, back-up and restore”, “Financial stability of vendor”, 
“Concentration on ‘core’ activities”, as well as “Service level agreement (SLA)”, since the provision relies 
on properly functioning networks. 
With regard to CC, Armbrust et al. (2010) take a more technical perspective and identify three obstacles to 
the adoption of Cloud solutions, five obstacles to the growth of CC, and two policy and business obstacles. 
Benlian et al. (2011) study the opportunities and risks of SaaS adoption perceived by IT executives at 
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adopter and non-adopter firms. The results of the survey indicate that for SaaS adopters as well as non-
adopters, security threats are the dominant factor influencing IT executives' overall risk perceptions. 
In summary, with the advent of new forms of ITO (i.e., ASP and CC), IT security risks have become one of 
the most salient perceived risk dimension and therefore have become increasingly relevant for IS 
research. However, no comprehensive conceptualization of this construct exists so far and previous 
studies were limited to simple and high-level conceptualizations with various heterogeneous indicators 
making it difficult to compare findings across studies and contribute to cumulative research. As such, the 
main objective of this study is to systematically develop and empirically validate an exhaustive and 
homogeneous conceptualization of “perceived IT security risk” (PITSR) of CC. 
Conceptualization of PITSR and Scale Development 
In the following sections, we develop a conceptualization of perceived IT security risks (PITSR) of CC and 
provide empirical support for the proposed conceptualization. Consistent with previous studies and to 
provide guidance in the scale development process, we first provide an initial definition of PITSR that 
draws on Featherman et al. (2003): 
PITSR refers to the decision maker’s perception of risks that affect the safety and security of a 
company’s IT when Cloud Computing is used as a sourcing model. 
On the basis of established scale development guidelines (Churchill 1979; DeVellis 2003; Hinkin 1998; 
MacKenzie et al. 2011), we take a systematic five-step approach, involving a variety of methods in order to 
develop a comprehensive conceptualization of PITSR and subsequently refine and validate a 
corresponding measurement scale. As shown in Figure 1, the five steps were (1) a literature review in 
order to develop an initial pool of security risk items, (2) a Q-sorting process to refine the wording and to 
confirm the initial clustering of items to security risk dimensions 3, (3) qualitative interviews in order to 
further evaluate and refine the scale’s measures, (4) construct conceptualization and model specification, 
and (5) the main survey to collect a larger set of data and to empirically validate the instrument. 
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Figure 1. Activities and Outcomes of our Five-Step Scale Development Process 
 
                                                             
3 Please note that throughout this article, we use the term “item” to refer to one individual risk and the term 
“dimension” to refer to one of the six identified clusters of items. 
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As the literature on CC risks was sparse, our literature review and Q-sorting focused on IT security risks 
related to all forms of ITO, such as traditional ASP as well as CC. This perspective was used in order to 
develop our initial pool of risk items as well as for evaluation of the initial clustering. All subsequent steps, 
starting with the expert interviews, were conducted focusing on IT security risks in CC contexts. 
Step 1: Deriving an Initial Pool of Risk Items and six Dimensions of PITSR 
A structured literature review was conducted to develop the content domain and the initial pool of risk 
items for PITSR4. We followed the guidelines provided by Cooper et al. (2009) and vom Brocke et al. 
(2009) and thoroughly documented the literature search process. As the initial review constitutes the 
foundation of all the following steps related to scale evaluation and refinement, it is important that the 
obtained results provide high validity (i.e., degree to which the search uncovers the sources; Levy and Ellis 
2006) and reliability (i.e. reliability of the search process). We chose to query the most common scientific 
databases5 without restricting the searches to specific journals or proceedings in order to gain high 
coverage of all relevant sources. For the same reason, the queries were not restricted to a fixed time frame. 
The search took place between May 28 and June 7, 2010, and resulted in 576 sources which were 
subsequently evaluated to assess their relevance for this study. After this first pre-selection, 149 articles 
were assessed based on a review of the entire content resulting in a final list of 65 papers. Content analysis 
of these 65 papers resulted in 757 risk items.6 
We successively refined the risk items and created the initial clustering of risk items to dimensions by 
following the approach described by Ma et al. (2005). As a first step, we merged items with same 
meanings, e.g., “Poor response speed”, “Low responsiveness”, and “Unresponsiveness”. Rarely referenced 
items that are subtypes of other items were also merged. For example, the items “Misuse services for 
sending spam” and “Misuse services for phishing” were merged because they are more concrete instances 
of the item “Identity theft”, i.e., the misuse of compromised credentials. Furthermore, we merged items 
that served as an instance of another risk item that was described on a higher level of abstraction. 
Thereby, we decreased the items’ redundancy. In this stage, we clustered similar items into different 
dimensions in order to build a risk taxonomy. The dimensions are based on existing categories from IT 
security and quality of service literature. Table 1 lists the sources for each risk dimension.7 
Table 1. Sources for each Security Risk Dimension 
Source Confiden-
tiality 
Integrity Availabi-
lity 
Perfor-
mance 
Accounta-
bility 
Maintaina-
bility 
Gouscos et al. 2004       
Avižienis et al. 2004       
Carr et al. 1993       
Olovsson 1992       
Landwehr 2001       
Álvarez and Petrović 2003       
                                                             
4 An earlier version of the literature review has been published in Ackermann et al. (2011). The article describes the 
structured literature review in more detail and includes all used keywords, date range, and a comprehensive 
discussion of the applied filtering process. 
5 For our collection of relevant publications, we used the following databases: EBSCOhost (with Business Source 
Premier and EconLit databases), ISI Web of Knowledge (with Web of Science database) and Science Direct. As our 
goal was to collect IT-related risks, we also queried the ACM Digital Library and the IEEE Xplore Digital Library as 
they cover the majority of publications from computer science disciplines. The AIS Electronic Library (AISel) was 
used to cover the proceedings of major IS conferences. This selection of scientific databases allowed searching the 
abstracts of 100% of the top 25 MIS journals according to AIS "MIS Journal Rankings" 2011. 
6 Due to space limitations, we omitted the list of sources and the results from the content analysis in this paper. They 
can be obtained from the authors upon request. 
7 Please note that some sources use the term “non-repudiation” instead of “accountability” for risks related to 
problems with identifying responsible parties and controlling access to the systems and data (Lampson 2009). 
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We moved the risk items to categories and added, renamed, or removed categories. The stage of 
regrouping items was repeated multiple times. For four iterations, we invited other IS and computer 
science experts into different regrouping stages in order to achieve an improvement of the clusters and to 
get feedback from different research backgrounds. In total, eight experts took part as coders in these 
regrouping sessions. After each iteration, we made sure, that the dimensions are exhaustive, i.e., that all 
items have been assigned to exactly one dimension. 
Confidentiality Integrity Availability Performance Accountability Maintainability
Perceived IT
Security Risk
 
Figure 2. The Six Risk Dimensions of Perceived IT Security Risk 
 
Step 1 ended with an initial pool of 39 risk items that were grouped into the six risk dimensions shown in 
Figure 2. The six dimensions are: confidentiality, integrity, availability, performance, accountability, and 
maintainability. Consistent with previous established research (Gouscos et al. 2004; Avižienis et al. 2004; 
Carr et al. 1993; Olovsson 1992; Landwehr 2001; Álvarez and Petrović 2003), the dimensions are defined 
as follows: Confidentiality remains intact, when data can only be read by authorized users. Integrity is 
given, when data cannot be modified, e.g., manipulated, by unauthorized persons. Availability means that 
users are able to access the service and the data whenever they want to. Performance denotes that the use 
of the service and the data take place in the speed that meets the customers' requirements. Accountability 
means that authentication mechanisms cannot be bypassed and that performed actions in the course of 
using the service and the data can clearly be assigned to an identifiable user. Finally, Maintainability 
remains intact, when it is possible to adapt the service to individual requirements, and when maintenance 
and support are ensured by the provider. 
Step 2: Refinement of the Initial Set of Risk Items 
The Q-sort method is an iterative process in which the degree of agreement between judges forms the 
basis of assessing construct validity and improving the reliability of the constructs (Nahm et al. 2002). 
The process combines validation of content and construct through experts and/or key informants who 
group items according to their similarity. Furthermore, it also eliminates items that do not match posited 
constructs (Straub et al. 2004). In each of three rounds, six judges (IS researchers), who were not engaged 
as coders in the first step in order to avoid the introduction of possible bias, were read short definitions of 
the six PITSR dimensions. Then, they were asked to assign randomly shuffled cards with the 39 risk items 
to exactly one of the six dimensions. We also asked the judges to name risks that are on another level of 
abstraction (i.e., more specific or more general) and to identify risks that could be merged where the 
assignment was difficult or unclear. After all cards were placed, the judges were told to check all 
assignments again and reorder cards in case the judges changed their minds. After each of the rounds 
performed, we calculated metrics described by Moore and Benbasat (1991) and Anderson and Gerbing 
(1991) in order to assess the validity of our categorization (see Table 2). 
After the first round of Q-sort, we merged five items, which were said to be similar by four of the six 
judges, into two new items. We also removed five items which were said to be too general by more than 
two judges. Furthermore, we rephrased all remaining items with an item placement ratio less than 80%, 
i.e., 13 out of our initial 39 risk items. The round ended with 31 security items of which 13 were reworded. 
During the second round of Q-sort, two rephrased items were said to be ambiguously formulated by four 
resp. three judges and were therefore rephrased again. Furthermore, we rephrased three items with an 
item placement ratio less than 80% for a second time. The third round of the Q-sort method showed that 
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rephrasing did not increase the low placement ratios of two items as both were still said to be ambiguous, 
and thus we decided to finally drop them after two “rewordings”. For five items, the placement ratios 
became greater than 80% and they were therefore kept, according to the threshold proposed by Hinkin 
(1998) of a minimum ratio of 75%. The Q-sort step ended with 29 risk items assigned to six security risk 
categories, with average item placement and class hit ratios of 94%, and an inter-rater reliability of 89%.  
Table 2. Statistics for each Round of the Q-Sort Method 
Round Average Item 
Placement Ratio 
Average Class 
Hit Ratio 
Average Cohen’s 
Kappa 
1st Round 72% 74% 68% 
2nd Round 87% 87% 82% 
3rd Round 91% 92% 86% 
Final Set of Risk Items 94% 94% 89% 
 
Step 3: Completion of the Set of Risk Items and Confirmation of the Clustering 
As it is important to aim for comprehensive coverage of items and avoid errors of omission during the 
conceptualization of the construct and scale development (Diamantopoulos 2011, p. 354), we conducted 
qualitative interviews among 24 experts working on various fields of IT security ranging from 
cryptography to hardware security, trust and privacy to malware analysis. The interviews, which took 
around 20 minutes on average, also helped us to analyze the relevance of each item, identify inappropriate 
or irrelevant items, and to improve understandability and coverage of the developed items (Xia and Lee 
2005). Furthermore, we refined the perspective of the scale development process in this step by explicitly 
focusing on CC. 
Following the process described by DeVellis (2003, p.86), for each of the 29 security risk items, we asked 
the experts whether the described risk is a) “obviously” b) “possibly” or c) “not part of” the target 
dimension. All items exceeded their proposed thresholds, i.e., at least 60% of the experts said that the 
item is obviously part of the dimension and at maximum 5% said that the item is not part of the 
dimension (see Table 3). 
Table 3. Interview Item Statistics 
Answer Minimum Average Maximum 
“obviously part of” 70.8% 87.2% 100.0% 
“possibly part of” 0.0% 11.5% 25.0% 
“not part of” 0.0% 1.3% 4.2% 
 
During the interviews, we discussed all risk items and, because the experts stated that some were 
redundant, decided to remove three items from our item pool leaving us with 26 items. We also asked 
whether some risks are hard to understand or descriptions might be ambiguous, which resulted in seven 
rephrased items. For example, we rephrased some items to include data processing on remote servers 
instead of restricting the description to remote storage only. 
Furthermore, in order to be as exhaustive as possible, we openly asked the experts if they know about IT 
security risk dimensions or specific items that we did not list. The experts confirmed the six dimensions 
and added five additional risk items (see items 4, 9, 15, 19, and 24 in Table 4). Those items are related to 
risks that occur in internal in-house systems instead of risks that occur at the side of the CC provider. 
While the Q-sort procedure (see Step 2) helped us to make sure that all items belong to the designated 
dimension, the interviews helped us to affirm another important aspect of content validity, i.e., that each 
risk dimension is exhaustively covered by its individual risk items. After the expert interviews, we ended 
up with the final list of 31 risk items depicted in Table 4. 
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Step 4: Construct Conceptualization and Model Specification 
In line with previous studies on risk perceptions (Peter and Tarpey 1975; Havlena and Desarbo 1990; 
Mitchell and Greatorex 1993; Featherman et al. 2006), and the guidelines for conceptualizing multi-
dimensional constructs in IS research (Polites et al. 2012), we model the aggregated perceived IT security 
risk as a multi-dimensional construct. Owing to the fundamental differences of reflective and formative 
measurement, possible misspecifications should be avoided (Jarvis et al. 2003; Petter et al. 2007; Bollen 
2011). While reflective indicators are affected by an underlying latent, unobservable construct, formative 
constructs are a composite of multiple measures (MacCallum and Browne 1993). Reflective and formative 
measures have different strengths and weaknesses, such as parsimony versus richness, generality versus 
precision, and few versus many items, respectively (Barki et al. 2007, p. 178). In order to decide how to 
model the relationship between the identified risk items and the risk dimensions, we applied the four 
decision rules given by Jarvis et al. (2003, p. 203), which all called for formative measurement. The 
identified risk dimensions are viewed as defining characteristics of the focal construct, in our study 
PITSR. Analogous to the formative view of individual risk items to our risk dimensions, the decision rules 
of Jarvis indicate that the sub-dimensions are formative indicators of the second-order focal construct. 
Therefore, we treat PITSR, our focal construct, as a function of its sub-dimensions and in summary, the 
resulting construct structure is classified as a formative first-order, formative second-order 
conceptualization (“type IV” in Jarvis et al. 2003). In this type of conceptualization, the dimensions are 
combined and aggregated to form the overall representation of the construct, and the indicators of each 
dimension likewise form their respective dimensions (Polites et al. 2012). The used form of an aggregate 
additive model allows that each dimension of perceived risk contributes separately to the meaning of the 
construct and might be differentially weighted. Unlike previous studies that treated IT related security 
risks as simple, one-dimensional measures, we propose a more complex construct that captures and 
combines aspects and relationships that have not been included before. 
Table 4. Final Set of Security Risk Dimensions and Security Risk Items 
ID Brief Risk Description: Risk of … ID Brief Risk Description: Risk of … 
 Confidentiality Risks  Performance Risks 
1 … eavesdropping communications 16 … network performance problems 
2 … supplier looking at sensitive data 17 … limited scalability 
3 … disclosure of data by the provider 18 … deliberate underperformance 
4 … disclosure of internal system data 19 … performance issues of internal systems 
 Integrity Risks  Accountability Risks 
5 … manipulation of transferred data 20 … identity theft 
6 … data manipulation at provider side 21 … insufficient user separation 
7 … accidental modification of transferred data 22 … insufficient logging of actions 
8 … accidental data modification at provider side 23 … access without authorization 
9 … data modification in internal systems 24 … missing logging of actions in internal systems 
 Availability Risks  Maintainability Risks 
10 … discontinuity of the service 25 … limited customization possibilities 
11 … unintentional downtime 26 … incompatible business processes 
12 … attacks against availability 27 … incompatible with new technologies 
13 … loss of data access 28 … limited data import 
14 … data loss at provider side 29 … proprietary technologies 
15 … insufficient availability of internal systems 30 … insufficient maintenance 
  31 … unfavorably timed updates 
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Step 5: Survey for Empirical Assessment and Validation 
Data Collection Procedures and Quality Assessments 
To assess the proposed conceptualization, a questionnaire was developed and pretested by cognitive 
interviews (Bolton 1993) with five IS researchers and three IS professionals, resulting in minor wording 
changes. The final questionnaire contained our final set of 31 security risk items, socio-demographics, 
intention to increase adoption, and reflective indicators for the empirical assessment of PITSR and the six 
sub-dimensions (see more detailed descriptions below). It was distributed to 6,000 German companies, 
randomly drawn from the Hoppenstedt database (release Q3 2011), which is a firm database containing 
more than 300,000 companies. To support the external validity of our study, we did not constrain the 
sample to specific industries or to firms of a specific organizational size. Whenever possible, we contacted 
the companies’ CIO. For some smaller companies only the CEO was available, whom we contacted in 
those cases. By contacting key informants, we assume that the survey respondents provide information at 
the aggregate or organizational unit of analysis by reporting on group or organizational properties rather 
than personal attitudes and behaviors (Phillips 1981). 
The study took place between August, 22th and October, 9th 2011. In order to minimize response-set 
artifacts, the sequence of the indicators of each dimension was randomized (Andrews 1984). We also used 
two versions of the printed questionnaire with altered ordering of the indicators. Participation was 
encouraged by offering an individualized free management report comparing the individual answers 
against companies of the same industry, and by reminders via mail. Additionally, we called approximately 
50% of the 6,000 companies for follow-up reminders. 
A total of 472 questionnaires were received, representing a response rate of 7.87%. Some of these 
responses had to be excluded from the sample due to missing data and low data quality. As we only used 
data sets without missing values, we excluded all questionnaires that were not fully completed by the 
respondents. Therefore, the results presented in this article are based on the final sample size of 356 valid 
responses. This response rate is still acceptable regarding the difficulties in obtaining survey responses 
from IS executives and corporate-level managers (Poppo and Zenger 2002). As our goal was to assess the 
risks perceived by (potential) users (and not accurate expert estimations), we did not exclude companies 
that are currently not using any CC services. 
Although the comparison of the respondents’ characteristics with those of the original target sample did 
not show major differences, we carried out further investigations of possible non-response bias. Following 
Armstrong and Overton (1977), we compared the first 25% and the late 25% of responses. Utilizing t-tests, 
none of the principal variables in our study showed significant differences. Additionally, we performed a 
series of chi-square comparisons which also showed no significant differences between early and late 
responses. During the phone calls, we asked for the reasons, why some companies did not want to 
participate. Most often, the reason was that company policies forbid taking part in surveys (because of 
security reasons, or the respondent was too busy or received too many surveys). Some told that they do 
not see themselves as the target group for CC, mostly because the existing IT infrastructure is too small. 
63% of all respondents were CEO or CIO and 84% of the respondents answered that they are directly 
responsible for the selection and decision regarding the considered type of application. 
Table 5. Sample Characteristics 
Company Size  Respondent Title 
16% Small businesses (<50 employees)  14% CEO 
39% Medium companies (50-249 employees)  49% CIO 
45% Large enterprises (>249 employees)  11% Head of IT department 
   17% Employee in IT department 
   9% Other 
 
Given the single method we had used to collect the data, we also conducted a series of tests in order to 
analyze common method bias (CMB). Harman’s one factor test using exploratory factor analysis 
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(Podsakoff and Organ 1986) resulted in 12 extracted factors, and the strongest component explained only 
34% of the variance, which is less than the proposed threshold of 50%. Furthermore, we tested for CMB 
using a latent common method factor (Bagozzi et al. 2011, p. 277ff). At maximum 7% of the variance in 
our reflective and formative measures were explained by the latent method factor. Finally, we included a 
correlational marker variable in our questionnaire (Bagozzi et al. 2011, p. 281f) that fulfilled the criteria of 
good correlational markers: on average, it showed the smallest correlation with all other manifest 
measures. All tests suggest that CMB is unlikely to have significantly affected our analyses and results. 
 
Figure 3. MIMIC Results for PITSR (N=356; *p<0.05; ** p<0.01; ***p<0.001) 
 
We apply covariance structure analysis (CSA) and employ LISREL (version 8.80; Jöreskog and Sörbom 
2006) as it is probably the most widely used software for CSA (Diamantopoulos 2011, p. 336), accounts 
for all the covariance in the data and provides more accurate parameter estimations than other techniques 
(Gefen et al. 2003). In order to identify the models, we used one of the scaling methods proposed by 
Diamantopoulos (2011, p. 345), i.e., fixing the path from a latent variable (i.e., construct) to an outcome 
variable (i.e., a reflective indicator) to unity (as recommended by Bollen and Davis 2009). For the 
establishment of reliability and validity of our developed PITSR scale, we follow the validation guidelines 
provided by MacKenzie et al. (2011). We use the multiple-indicators, multiple-causes approach (MIMIC) 
in order to achieve model identification (Diamantopoulos 2011; Diamantopoulos and Winkelhofer 2001). 
The MIMIC approach requires that constructs having formative indicators, i.e., the dimensions of 
perceived IT security, are also assessed with appropriate reflective indicators. Consequently, two 
individual reflective indicators for each dimension were developed based on Featherman and Pavlou 
(2003). As the focal construct, the aggregated PITSR, was not measured by any formative indicators, we 
added a third reflective measure based on Featherman and Pavlou (2003). The final MIMIC-based 
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measurement model for the sub-dimensions as well as for the aggregate PITSR construct is depicted in 
Figure 3. 
Evaluating the Goodness of Fit of the Measurement Model 
As LISREL was utilized for the analysis of the MIMIC structural equation models (SEM), we assessed 
whether the estimation procedure converged and that none of the variance estimates were negative, i.e., 
whether the solution was “proper“. With its 518 degrees of freedom (df), the model has a chi-square 
statistic of 1,386 that is strongly significant (p=0.0). The chi-square/df ratio of 2.676 indicates a good 
model fit (Carmines and McIver 1981; Wheaton et al. 1977). Consistent with established 
recommendations on the evaluation of LISREL estimation results, a number of absolute and relative fit 
indices were analyzed in order to evaluate the overall model fit. Regarding the absolute fit of the model, 
we received mixed results. While the SRMR (standardized root mean square residual) of 0.074 indicates 
good model fit and the GFI (goodness of fit index) of 0.842 is below the commonly used threshold of 0.90, 
the RMSEA (root mean square error of approximation) of 0.075 is slightly above the threshold of 0.06 
proposed by MacKenzie (2011, p.312f), but still in an acceptable range (Browne and Cudeck 1993). 
However, due to the high model complexity (31+12+3=46 indicators and 7 latent variables) and the 
comparably low sample size of N=356, the results of the relative fit indices, which are less sensitive to 
sample size, should be considered (Hu and Bentler 1999). Therefore, we also assessed the fit relative to a 
suitably framed comparison model and received decent fit statistics: The CFI (comparative fit index) of 
0.982 indicates a good model fit. Likewise, the NFI (normed fit index) of 0.972 as well as the TLI (Tucker 
Lewis index) of 0.964 are all above the threshold of 0.95 proposed by Hu and Bentler (1999). For these 
reasons, we conclude that our measurement model has an acceptable goodness of fit. 
Table 6. Fit Statistics for the Basic Measurement Model 
Model chi² df chi²/df GFI RMSEA SRMR CFI NFI TLI 
Basic Model 1,386 518 2.676 0.842 0.075 0.074 0.982 0.972 0.964 
 
Table 6 shows the goodness of fit indices for the basic measurement model consisting of PITSR, the focal 
construct, as well as its six IT security risk dimensions and their MIMIC indicators. Note that the isolated 
MIMIC models for the six IT security risk sub-dimensions were omitted here, because they just slightly 
differed from the aggregate model presented in Figure 3. 
Assessing the Validity and Reliability of the Set of Indicators at the Construct Level 
The convergent validity of the sub-dimensions was assessed by calculating the average variance extracted 
(AVE) for our six first-order latent constructs which should exceed 0.5 (Fornell and Larcker 1981).8 The 
results show that the AVEs for all risk dimensions vary between 0.777 and 0.907, and clearly exceed the 
given threshold. Following Diamantopoulos et al. (2008, p. 1216), we used the magnitude of the construct 
level error term in order to assess the validity of the sets of indicators at the construct level. The variance 
of the residual is smaller than the explained variance (R²) for all formative constructs except integrity-
related risks, where R² is 0.48 and zeta is 0.52. For all reflective indicators, we assessed whether 
Cronbach’s alpha and Fornell and Larcker’s (1981) construct reliability index both exceed the threshold of 
0.7 for newly developed measures (Nunnally and Bernstein 1994). This is the case for all constructs, which 
suggests internal consistency and reliability of the reflective indicators. 
Evaluating Individual Indicator Validity and Reliability 
The relationships between each reflective indicator and its hypothesized latent construct are large and 
statistically significant, indicating strong validity of the individual reflective indicators (MacKenzie et al. 
                                                             
8 For first-order latent constructs with formative indicators it is not necessary to check for convergent validity, as the 
formative specification does not imply that the indicators should necessarily be correlated (MacKenzie et al. 2011, p. 
313). 
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2011, p. 314). While the path from each latent variable to its first outcome variable, i.e., the first reflective 
indicator, has always been fixed to unity (Diamantopoulos 2011; Bollen and Davis 2009), all other 
reflective indicators are highly significant (p<0.001). The standardized estimates of the relationships, i.e., 
the lambdas, rage from 0.874 to 0.973 for the six risk dimensions, and 0.792 to 0.902 for the indicators of 
our second-order focal construct PITSR. 
We also assessed the degree of validity for each reflective indicator, which is the unique proportion of 
variance in the indicator accounted for by the construct and which should exceed 0.5. As in our model, all 
indicators are hypothesized to load on exactly one construct, the degree of validity is equal to square of the 
completely standardized loading, lambda² (MacKenzie et al. 2011, p. 314). Lambda² ranges from 0.765 to 
0.947 for the six risk dimensions, and 0.627 to 0.813 for our focal construct PITSR. These high values 
suggest the validity of our selection of reflective indicators. 
For first-order latent constructs with formative indicators, we analyzed the paths from indicators to latent 
construct. All paths are significant, except three indicators (i.e., see indicators 5, 13, and 28 in Table 4) 
that are related to integrity, availability, and maintainability risks. However, it is important to ensure that 
all of the essential aspects of the construct domain are captured by the remaining indicators and sub-
dimensions when using formative measures (MacKenzie et al. 2011, p. 317). Therefore, in the following, 
we carefully look at these three indicators and judge whether the exhaustiveness of a dimension would be 
affected when they are removed. 
First, the integrity-related risk (indicator 5) that “data are manipulated during transmission” showed a 
nonsignificant loading and a relatively small path coefficient (0.05). However, all five indicators of the 
integrity risks dimension (see Table 4) are mutually exclusive and collectively exhaustive. One measure is 
related to data modification in internal systems, while the other four are related to external data. These 
four indicators differ regarding two characteristics: deliberate manipulation vs. accidental modification, 
as well as data at the provider side vs. data in transit. In order not to violate the collective exhaustiveness, 
we decided to keep the nonsignificant item related to deliberate manipulation of transferred data. For 
example, malicious attackers could manipulate the data transferred to the CC provider when no or weak 
encryption is used, e.g., by conducting man-in-the-middle attacks (Dawoud et al. 2010; Jensen et al. 
2009). The second nonsignificant item (indicator 13) was the availability-related risk that a company “can 
no longer log on to the service and therefore loses access to the data” with a path coefficient of 0.04. The 
risk could occur because users are no longer able to log on to the service and as a consequence, the service 
users could end up with no access to their data which are stored on remote servers (Schwarz et al. 2009; 
Viega 2009). Despite the nonsignificant loading, we decided to keep this risk as loss of access is an 
important reason for non-availability in a CC context according to the IT security experts interviewed 
during scale refinement. Third, the maintainability-related risk (indicator 28) that “it is difficult to import 
existing data into the provisioned application type” showed a relatively small path coefficient (0.03) and a 
nonsignificant loading. In order to be able to migrate existing data to the new provider, it should be 
possible (and not too difficult) that data held on existing systems can be used with or incorporated into 
the new CC service. In addition to limited export functionalities and the related lock-in problem, there is 
the risk that a provider does not offer adequate possibilities to import existing data (Currie 2003; 
Gonçalves and Ballon 2009). Following Diamantopoulos and Winklhofer (2001, p. 273), “indicator 
elimination — by whatever means — should not be divorced from conceptual considerations when a 
formative measurement model is involved”. This is especially important due to the fact that the relevance 
of each risk item varies depending on the use context. This results in different risk items being significant 
in different samples. In order to ensure the content validity of the PITSR construct, we therefore decided 
to keep all three indicators.  
We tested for redundancy in the indicators using the variance inflation factor (VIF). With 1.181 to 2.549, 
the VIFs for each dimension were always below the cutoff level of 10 (e.g., Diamantopoulos and 
Winklhofer 2001), and the more conservative level of 3 (e.g., Petter et al. 2007). As the three formative 
indicators cover essential parts of their dimensions, were confirmed by expert interviews, and because 
analysis of the VIF showed that they are not redundant, we decided to keep them, even if they had 
insignificant loadings. This is in line with recommendations by Diamantopoulos et al. (2008). The other 
28 indicators are significant with at least p<0.05. 
Second-order latent constructs with first-order sub-dimensions as formative indicators should have sub-
dimensions that are significantly related to it. Our six first-order risk dimensions are all significantly 
 Ackermann et. al. / Perceived IT Security Risks of Cloud Computing 
  
 Thirty Third International Conference on Information Systems, Orlando 2012 13 
related to PITSR with p<0.05 (*) for integrity, p<0.01 (**) for performance and maintainability, and 
p<0.001 (***) for confidentiality, availability, and accountability. Table 7 summarizes the results for 
formative indicators and the effects of the formative dimensions. 
 
Table7. Statistics for Formative Indicators (*p<0.05; ** p<0.01; ***p<0.001) 
Construct Significance of Formative Indicators R² Effect on 
PITSR ns * ** *** 
Confidentiality - - 1 3 0.62 *** 
Integrity 1 - 2 2 0.48 * 
Availability 1 1 - 4 0.51 *** 
Performance - - - 4 0.55 ** 
Accountability - 1 - 4 0.63 *** 
Maintainability 1 2 1 3 0.62 ** 
PITSR - 1 2 3 0.59  
 
Regarding the reliability of the individual indicators, our models passed all tests proposed by MacKenzie 
et al. (2011, p. 314-316). For first-order latent constructs with reflective indicators, we tested whether the 
squared multiple correlation for each indicator exceeds 0.5 (Bollen 1989). The obtained values of 0.765 to 
0.947 for the six risk dimensions and 0.627 to 0.813 for the indicators of our focal construct PITSR 
suggest that the majority of the variance in the reflective indicators is due to the latent construct. The 
reliability of each individual formative indicator was assessed using inter-rater reliabilities during the 
scale evaluation and refinement steps (MacKenzie et al. 2011, p. 315). For PITSR, our focal second-order 
constructs with first-order sub-dimensions as formative indicators, the Fornell and Larcker’s (1981) 
construct reliability (CR) index takes values of 0.875 to 0.951 for the six risk dimensions and 0.887 for 
PITSR and, thus, supports the reliability of each individual sub-dimension. 
Assessing the Nomological Validity of the Construct 
The nomological validity of the PITSR construct was assessed by adding a nomological consequence 
construct, i.e., the companies’ intention to increase their adoption of CC. The relationship between 
perceived risk and adoption intentions and behavior has been subject to a number of studies. In line with 
the Theory of Reasoned Action (Ajzen and Fishbein 1980), we argue that management’s intention to 
change the level of sourcing based on CC depends on its attitude towards CC, which is influenced by 
salient positive and negative beliefs about it. Various studies have confirmed that the intention to increase 
adoption is directly and negatively related to perceived IT security risks (e.g., Benlian et al. 2011; Gewald 
and Dibbern 2009; Gewald et al. 2006). Therefore, we added the company’s intention to increase 
adoption (IIA) to the nomological network as it is caused by PITSR, our focal construct. 
Table 8. Fit Statistics for the Nomological Measurement Model (including a Criterion Variable) 
Model chi² df chi²/df GFI RMSEA SRMR CFI NFI TLI 
Nomological Model 1,501 608 2.468 0.838 0.069 0.073 0.982 0.970 0.966 
 
According to MacKenzie et al. (2011, p. 321), the nomological validity of a construct is given, if the 
estimates of the relationship of PITSR and its hypothesized consequence IIA are significant and show the 
anticipated sign. The highly significant, negative path coefficient between PITSR and IIA (β=-0.53, 
p<0.001), and the ratio of explained variance of IIA (R²=0.28) strongly confirm the hypothesized 
relationship. This result is consistent with prior theory and shows that the indicators of our focal 
construct relate to measures of other constructs in the manner expected. Hence, we can conclude that our 
measure of the perceived IT security risk of CC is nomologically valid. 
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The adequacy of the hypothesized multi-dimensional structure was also assessed by comparisons 
proposed by Steward and Segars (2002) and Bansal (2011). We compared the nomological network to a 
nomological network without the focal, second-order construct, i.e., all dimensions are directly linked to 
the intention to increase adoption. Comparison of the goodness of fit indices showed that the multi-
dimensional model which includes the focal construct exhibits a lower chi²/df ratio as well as better 
RMSEA, CFI, and TLI. These results also suggest that PITSR may be represented as a second-order factor 
structure rather than a set of six first-order factors.  
Discussion  
The main objective of this study was to systematically develop and empirically validate a comprehensive 
and rich conceptualization of perceived IT security risks of CC. Based on a rigorous scale development 
process that included several qualitative and quantitative methods, we first derived a multi-dimensional 
construct of perceived IT security risks encompassing six major sub-dimensions that together form the 
overall (aggregate) construct. In a second major step, we empirically validated the form and implications 
of the developed multi-dimensional, second-order construct. Our results provide several important 
theoretical, methodological and practical contributions. 
First, this research advances our understanding of IT security risks of CC by providing greater conceptual 
clarity on the key components and facets of PITSR and how they relate to each other in forming the 
construct. Despite valuable and insightful previous research efforts, IT security risk has been used 
heterogeneously and without recognizing its more complex nature. To the best of our knowledge, our 
study is the first to provide a conceptualization of perceived IT security risk in IS research that – in line 
with traditional theories on risk perception – comprehensively captures the complex and multi-
dimensional nature of the construct. Grounded on a broad literature review, Q-sort procedure, and 
extensive expert interviews, we identified confidentiality, integrity, availability, performance, 
accountability, and maintainability as the six major sub-dimensions forming perceived IT security risk of 
CC. This in-depth conceptualization contributes to IT security research and allows to transfer theories on 
risk perception to the IS context. Further, it advances our understanding of adoption decisions in the ITO 
context.  The strong relation between perceived IT security risk and the intention to increase adoption is 
an important theoretical contribution to the IT security and IT risk literature. Although it has been shown 
that there are many factors influencing the adoption decision of potential customers and users, such as 
subjective norm (Fishbein and Ajzen 1975), perceived benefits (Chwelos et al. 2001) and opportunities 
(Gewald and Dibbern 2009), as well as other types of risk, e.g., economic and strategic risk (Benlian and 
Hess 2011), perceived IT security risk, in and of itself, explains 28% of the dependent variable’s variance 
(see the section about PITSR’s nomological validity). As such, future research in CC adoption may be well 
advised to consider and incorporate PITSR as one of the major influencing factors. Second, our work also 
contributes a validated scale and thus a comprehensive operationalization that provides an intensively 
tested measurement instrument for perceived IT security risk of CC. The developed scale has been 
systematically evaluated including several steps of quantitative and qualitative assessments. We also 
conducted a test of predictive validity showing that PITSR behaves as expected in a broader nomological 
network that includes adoption intention as dependent variable. As such, we showed that PITSR 
adequately captures the complex and multi-dimensional nature of the underlying latent construct and 
thus advances traditional, uni-dimensional operationalizations in previous research. We hope that 
researchers will use the scale as a platform for future research related to IT security risk (e.g., in the 
context of TAM, UTAUT and TRA). 
There are several avenues for further research regarding the conceptualization and operationalization of 
PITSR. On the conceptual level, the process of forming users’ risk perceptions should be further 
investigated. As media coverage of single IT security incidents can have an effect on the perception of all 
IT security risks, an event study on the basis of experimentation could be used to better understand the 
forming process of risk perceptions. The concept of risk controversies in the context of CC could be 
investigated by replicating the study among IT security experts and comparing the perceptions of 
(potential) users and IT security professionals. Moreover, the proposed concept for IT security risk 
perception could be extended to cover aspects of other (even future) types of ITO. Further research 
regarding the operationalization should cross-validate the scale using new samples. 
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The primary practical contribution lies in the empirical evidence that perceived IT security risk (PITSR) 
can, in and of itself, explain a substantial portion of customers’ adoption decisions in the CC context. This 
has implications for both (potential) customers and providers of CC. For customers, the developed multi-
dimensional conceptualization with its detailed taxonomy of IT security risks furnishes useful suggestions 
on how to flesh out contracts or SLAs with a provider. Furthermore, our results can facilitate the IT risk 
management process of potential users during the phases of risk identification and quantification. During 
risk identification, the provided conceptualization can serve as a checklist, as it includes all relevant IT 
security risks for evaluating the performance of (alternative) CC providers. In the course of risk 
quantification, the estimations of internal security experts may provide a first approximation. The highly 
significant relation between perceived IT security risk and the adoption intention is especially relevant, 
since the perceived risk can differ from the actual level of risk. This misjudgment of risk can lead to wrong 
or harmful decisions, like the extreme example of road kills after September 11 drastically illustrates 
(Gigerenzer, 2004). Therefore, there is a huge potential to correct these misjudgments if CC providers can 
draw on a validated instrument that makes potential biases transparent. The quantification of users’ 
individual risk perceptions can provide the basis for targeted efforts to manage these perceptions. This 
may be done by implementing concrete technical countermeasures and by well-directed communication 
efforts to build up trust among (potential) customers. Our in-depth conceptualization of PITSR thereby 
allows differentiating between distinct sub-dimensions of perceived IT security risk that may have also to 
be treated differently by CC providers. 
Limitations 
Some limitations of the present study should also be noted. Despite their nonsignificant loadings, three 
indicators from three different risk dimensions were not removed, in order not to violate the dimension’s 
exhaustiveness. As all three indicators cover important aspects of their dimensions, were confirmed by 
expert interviews, and because analysis of the VIF showed that they are not redundant, we decided to keep 
them as part of PITSR’s content domain. However, future studies should reinvestigate these indicators 
and assess them in other contexts. 
Theoretically, the collected data is only valid for the time that the survey took place and the external 
validity of our results may also be undermined by common method variance, as we collected data from 
participants at the same time using the same survey. Even though various tests confirm that common 
method bias is not an issue, the developed PITSR scale should be cross-validated on a fresh, second set of 
data. This would also allow checking if and how much the assessment changes over time. According to 
Tversky and Kahneman (1973), Combs and Slovic (1979), and Sjöberg and Engelberg (2010), the 
availability of information is a cornerstone of heuristics for the individual assessment of risks. Therefore, 
a major security incident and coverage in mass media could lead to changes in the perception of some 
risks.  
Conclusion 
Given that IT security risks in Cloud Computing are one of, if not the most important factor in affecting 
outsourcing and adoption decisions and given that previous studies fell short of capturing perceived IT 
security risk’s full complexity, it has become critical for practitioners and researchers alike to develop a 
comprehensive conceptualization and an empirically validated measurement scale to regularly assess 
perceived IT security risk.  
With this study, we provided both an IT security risk measurement instrument with practical significance 
and applications, as well as important theoretical contributions in IT security and risk research. We hope 
that it will serve as a springboard for future research studies and also aid CC providers in better 
addressing their (potential) clients’ IT security risk perceptions. To the extent that researchers may be 
able to transfer (parts of) the scale to other IT security risk domains, PITSR may also serve as a validated 
baseline measure that makes it much easier to compare and consolidate findings across studies and 
contexts. 
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Appendix 
Table 9. Reliability and Validity of Reflective Measurement Models 
Construct Factor 
Loadings 
Alpha AVE CR Max. Squared 
Inter-construct Correlation 
Confidentiality 0.898; 0.931 0.946 0.837 0.911 0.377 
Integrity 0.973; 0.931 0.968 0.907 0.951 0.148 
Availability 0.889; 0.874 0.916 0.777 0.875 0.265 
Performance 0.932; 0.922 0.946 0.858 0.924 0.106 
Accountability 0.948; 0.902 0.945 0.856 0.922 0.255 
Maintainability 0.956; 0.933 0.958 0.892 0.943 0.111 
PITSR 0.792 - 0.902 0.901 0.725 0.887 0.377 
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